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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
OREGO·N SHORT LINE RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRAND·E 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and App~ellant. 
Case No. 
7701 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Oregon Short Line Railroad 'Company brought this 
action to condemn a right of way over the track and right 
of way of The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company at the point fixed by order of Public Service 
Commission of Utah, which order was upheld by this Court 
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in The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
v. Public Serv·ice Commission of Utah and Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 2-30 P. (2) 55,7 (not officially reported). 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company alleged, in para-
graph 1 of its complaint that it was engaged as a common 
carrier for hire in the public transportation of persons 
and commodities of all kinds within the State of Utah and 
all other States (R. 1) . This was denied (R. 8). Also at 
pretrial it insisted that it was at that time a common car-
rier (R. 22). 
The undisputed evidence shows that Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company is a Utah corporation organized before 
1900 as a railroad corporation but that it has not operated 
as a common carrier in any particular since January 1, 1'9:36 
(R. 85, 90, 96, 97, Ex. C). On that date it leased its entire 
property, both real and personal, to Union Pacific Railroad 
Company for one hundred years, with provisions for ex-
tensions of such lease for an indefinite period thereafter 
(R. 85, Ex. C). On that day also Union Pacific Railroad 
·Company assumed all Oregon Short Line Railroad ~Company 
rates (R. 129, Ex. L). Since that date Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company has had no tariffs or schedules estab-
lishing any rates for the carriage of passengers or freight 
in interstate or intrastate commerce filed with Interstate 
Commerce Commission or Public Service Commission of 
Utah (R. 129) and therefore could not and cannot haul 
passengers or freight as a common carrier without violat-
ing the provisions of Sec. 6, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the 
Transportation Act of 192:0, 49 U. S. C. A., pp. 2~36-238, 
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and Sec. 76-3-2, U. C. A. 1943, and being subjected to crim-
inal penalties under those laws (R. 128). 
Since January 1, 1936, Oregon Short Line Railroad 
Company has not carried any freight or passengers or en-
gaged in any activities whatever as a common carrier (R. 
85, 90, 96, 97, Ex. C). It has no superintendent, train-
masters, roadmasters, section foremen, engineers, firemen, 
conductors, brakemen, sectionmen, or any other officers, 
agents or employees (R. 90, 96, 97), excepting only F. C. 
Paulsen (General Manager of Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany at Salt Lake :City), who is also General Manager of 
Oregon Short Line Railroad ,Company but whose sole func-
tion as such has been and is the signing of leases for ·Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Company (R. 87, 88). 
In this state of the record the court should have found, 
concluded and adjudged as set forth in the Statement of 
Points upon which appellant intends· to rely for reversal 
of the judgment. 
1. The District Court should have found in 
accordance with the uncontradicted evidence that 
plaintiff and respondent is not and has not been 
since January 1, 1936, engaged as a common carrier 
for hire in any transportation of either persons or 
commodities in Utah or elsewhere. 
2. The District Court should have found in 
accordance with the uncontradicted evidence that 
plaintiff and respondent is not engaged in render-
ing any public service at this time and has not been 
since January 1, 19-36, and that there is no reason-
able prospect that it will be so engaged at any time 
in the future. 
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3. The District Court should have concluded 
that plaintiff and respondent is not entitled to con-
demn a crossing over the property of defendant and 
appellant because plaintiff and respondent is not 
engaged in the rendition of any public service. 
4. The judgment is. against law because plain-
tiff and respondent is not engaged in the rendition of 
any public service and therefore has no right of 
condemnation. 
These four points involve a single question of law. 
S'TAT·EMENT OF P·OINT u·PoN WHICH AP-
PELLANT RELIES FOR REVERSAL O·F JUDG-
MENT. 
A CORPORATION D·OES NOT HAVE THE 
P·O'WER OF EMINENT DOMAIN AS A RAIL-
RO·AD ·CORPO·RAT'ION UNDER U·TA.H LAW 
UNLESS IT' IS ENGAGED AS A ·COMMON CAR-
RIER AND THE CONTEMPLA'TED USE IS 
P·UBLIC. 
ARGUMENT 
1. A CORPORATION DO·ES NOT BE,COME A 
CO·MMON· CARRIER B.Y LEGIS.LATIVE FIAT, 
P·UB.LIC BERVI,CE COMMISSION ORDER OR 
BY PROVISIONS O·F ITS C:HARTER. IT MUST 
HAVE THE ATTRIBUTES WHI·CH, IN LAW, 
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ST'AT·Us. OF ·CO·M-
MON CARRIE.R. 
2. UNDER T'HE UT'AH STATUTES AND 
·CASES T·H·E TAKING MUST BE FOR A PUB-
LIC PURP:OSE. 
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3. A RAILROAD COMPANY CANNOT ·CON-
DEMN LAND FOR USES NOT CONNE·CTED 
WITH THE CONDUCT OF ITS. BUSINESS AS 
A COMMON CARRIER. 
The Utah statutes in regard to eminent domain pro-
vide as follows : 
"77 -0-5. Every railroad corporation organized 
under the laws of this state * * * shall have 
the following powers : 
* * * * * 
"' (3) * * * to condemn in the manner 
provided by law a right of way * * *.' 
" '104-61-1. Subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exer-
cised in behalf of the following public uses: 
* * * * * 
" ' ( 4) * * * railroads and street railways 
for public transportation.' " 
The Constitutional justification for delegating the 
power of Eminent Domain to Railroads is that they are 
engaged in the public service as common carriers and there-
fore the property taken would be used for the public. 
In re Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108 
N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429:; 
Elliott on Railroads, 2nd Ed., Sec. 954. 
But if the Railroad Company is not a common carrier 
or if the particular use for which the property is taken 
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6 
is not a public use, that railroad company cannot exercise 
the power of eminent domain. And a railroad company 
does not become a common carrier merely because its ar-
ticles of incorporation so state. 
1. A CORPORATION DOES NOT BE·COME A 
COM1MON CARRIER BY LEGISLATIVE FlAT, 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER OR 
BY PROVISION8 OF ITS c:HAR'TER. IT· M.UST 
HAVE THE AT'TRIBUTES WHICH, IN LAW, 
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ST'ATUS 0'F CO·M-
MON C'ARRIER. 
McCarthy v. Public Servic·e Commission, 111 Utah 481, 
184 P. (2d) 220, (1947). The Public Service :Commission 
by its order purported to make common carriers. of truck-
ers whose activities were not those of a common carrier. 
It was held that the order was illegal. On page 49'3 the 
court said: 
"The defendants are rendering a private ser-
vice to their customers. They are not engaged in a 
public service inviting an indefinite public generally 
to hire them ; nor does the public have a legal right 
to the use of their facilities. There being no evidence 
that they have held themselves out to such a public, 
the action of the commission in classifying defen-
dants as common carriers was error in law and with-
out proper foundation." 
State v. Nelson, 65· Utah 45:7, 23:8 P. 23~. 
This case has become a leading case having been cited 
by many courts of the country. Nelson had a contract to 
carry passengers and baggage between Salt Lake ·City and 
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Utah Out-Door Association at Brighton. The State at-
tempted to enjoin his operation because he had no certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity. The court held that he 
was not operating as a common carrier. On pages 46,1-462 
the court said : 
"* * * They all recognize that a common or 
public carrier is one who, by virtue of his business 
or calling or holding out, undertakes for compensa-
tion to transport persons or property, or both, from 
one place to another for all such as may choose to 
employ him. Running through the cases is a recog-
nition of the dominent element of public· servic·e, serv._ 
ing and carrying al-l persons indifferently who arp-
ply for passage Orr for shipment of goods or freight. 
To .constitute a common carrier such element is also 
requisite under the Utilities Act. It defines a 'com-
mon carrier,' as the term is used therein, to include 
among others every automobile corporation engaged 
in the transportation of persons or property for 
public service over regular routes between points 
within the state and an automobile corporation to 
include every corporation or person engaged in or 
transacting business of transporting passengers or 
freight, merchandise, or other property, for compen-
sation by means of automobiles or automobile stages 
on public streets, roads, or highways along estab-
lished routes within the state. Public servic·e, as dis-
tinguished from mere private service, is thus a nec·es-
sary factor to constitute a common carrier. * * * 
In other words, the state may not, by mere legislative 
fiat or edict or by regulating orders of a commission, 
convert mere private contracts or a mere private 
business into a public utility· or make its owner a 
common carrier. * * * So, if the business or 
concern is not public service, where the public has 
not a legal right to the use of it, where the business 
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or operation is not op~en to an indefinite public, it is 
not subject to the jurisdic·tion or regulation of the 
commission.'' 
The Nelson case has received approval in the recent 
case of Garkane Pow·er Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
9-8 Utah 466, 100 P. (2d) 571. Referring to the Nelson 
case the court on page 572 said : 
"The distinction there made is valid, and is con-
clusive of this case. Garkane does not propose to 
hold itself out to serve all who apply and live near 
its lines; its very charter which gives it existence 
restricts its service to a certain group (members). 
It dJ.oes not propos·e to serv~e 'the public· generally,' 
but only to serve its members." 
The Nelson case has been cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Frost v. Railroad 
C01nmission, 271 U. S. 583, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 46 S. ·Ct. 605, 
such citation appearing on page 607. 
The Court of Appeals of New York has held that a 
railroad corporation must be a common carrier and that 
it does not become such merely by so stating in its articles 
of incorporation. In In re Niagara Falls and Whirlpool 
Ry. Co., 108 N.Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, the New ~ork statute 
authorized condemnation for a right of way by this. railway 
which proposed to build along the shore of the Niagara 
River to be used for sight-seers during four months of the 
year. The court said : 
"* * * The right of the state to authorize 
the condemnation of private property for the con-
struction of railroads, and to delegate the power to 
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take proceedings for that purpose to railroad cor-
porations, has become an accepted doctrine of con-
stitutional law, and is not open to debate. B'ut the 
power is dormant until the legislature authorizes its 
exercise: and the particula.J· corporation which claims 
the right to exe1·cise the power must be able to show 
a legisla.tive ·n'arrant, and, that being shown, it must 
be able, further, to establish, if the right is chal-
lenged. that the particula.r scheme in which it is en-
gaged is a railroad enterprise within the true m..ean-
ing of the decisions whick iustify the taking of pri-
vate property fo7" railroad purposes; or that the busi-
ness which it is organized to carry on is public·; and 
that the taking of private property for the purposes 
of the corporation is a taking for public· use. The 
general principle is now well settled that when the 
uses are in fact public, the necessity or expediency 
of taking private property for such uses by the ex-
ercise of the power of eminent domain, the instru-
mentalities to be used and the extent to which such 
right shall be delegated are questions appertaining 
to the political and legislative branches of the gov-
ernment; while, on the other hand, the question 
whether the uses are, in fact,. public, so as to justify 
the taking in invitum of private property therefor, 
is a judicial question to be determined by the courts. 
Beekman v. Railroad Co., 3 Paige, 45; In re Ceme-
tery Ass'n, 66 N. Y. 569; In re Ferry, 98 N. Y. 13-9~.. 
15·3. 
"If the question whether the purposes and ob-
jects for which the petitioner, the Niagara Falls & 
Whirlpool Railway Company, is organized, are pub-
lic, so as to justify the exercise in its behalf of the 
right of eminent domain, is controlled and is to be 
tested exclusively by the description of those objects 
and purp-oses as they are set forth in its articles of 
association, there coul'd be no hesitation in c·onclwi-
ing that the company is entitled to take the proc-eed-
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10 
ings now in question, unless the particular property 
now sought to be taken, is, on special grounds, ex-
empt from ·condemnation. Looking at the articles 
of association alone, it appears that the company is 
a railroad corporation organized under the general 
railroad act for 'public use in transporting persons 
and property' by a railroad to be constructed between 
certain termini. The papers, on their face, show 
that the corporation has undertaken an ordinary 
railroad enterprise within the purview of the act of 
1850, in aid of which the power of eminent domain 
may be appropriately exercised. But, when we look 
beyond the formal documents, and the actual busi-
ness proposed to be conducted is considered, we find 
that the proposed railroad has no proper termini; 
that it is not a highway in any just or proper sense; 
that it cannot, by reason of necessary limitations, 
perform one part of the duty it has undertaken, viz., 
the transportation of freight; that, at most, it can 
be operated but a portion of the year; and that the 
sole object of its construction is to enable the cor-
poration, for a compensation to be received, to pro-
vide for the portion of the public who may visit 
Niagara Falls better opportunities for seeing the 
natural attractions of the locality. We feel con-
strained to say that, in our judgment, this is not a 
public purpose which justifies the exercise of the 
high prerogative of sovereignty invoked in aid of 
this enterprise. The right of the company being 
challenged on this ground, the court is compelled to 
consider it, and it is manifest that the inquiry is no·t 
precluded because the petitioner has orgunized its·elf 
under the general railroad act, and has assumed in 
its articles of association the character of an ordt-
nary railroad corporation. * * * It is especially 
necessary that the question .of what constitutes a 
public use should not be dealt with in a critical or 
illiberal spirit, or made to depend upon a close con-
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struction adverse to the public; but, having these 
considerations in mind, we are nevertheless con-
strained to conclude that the enterprise in question 
is essentially private and not public, and that pri-
vate property cannot be taken against the will of 
the owners for the construction of the road of the 
petitioner." 
Elliott on Railroads, 3rd Edition, Sec. 1204, states the 
rule in accordance with the New York case. The author 
states: 
"Accordingly it has been held that the corpora-
tion which claims the right to exercise the power of 
eminent domain must not only show a legislative 
warrant, but it must be able, further, to establish, 
if the right is challenged, that the particular scheme 
in which it is engaged is a railroad enterprise within 
the true meaning of the decisions which justify the 
taking of private property for railroad purposes·; 
and that the taking of private property for the pur-
pose to which the corporation proposes to devote, is 
a taking for a public purpose." 
It is to be observed that the foregoing language is taken 
literally from the Niagara case. 
2. UNDER THE UTAH STATUTES AND 
CASES T·HE TAKING MUST BE FOR A PU·B-
LIC PURP·OSE. 
The Utah statute on eminent domain, Sec. 104-6·1-1, 
authorizes the right of eminent domain "in behalf of the 
following public uses." In subparagraph (4) appear the 
words "and railroads-for public transportation." In Sec. 
77-0-5, subparagraph (3), the railroad corporation is given 
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12 
the right "* * * to condemn in the manner provided by 
law"-this, of course, refers to the general provisions of 
the statute relating to eminent domain. 
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 
201, 77 P. 849, the Supreme ·Court of Utah made the fol-
lowing statement on page 851 : 
"* * * The test is, will any and all persons 
and business institutions who may have occasion to 
do so be permitted to use it? That is, will the track 
be open to public use generally? If so, then it is a 
public utility. * * *" 
In the Stockdale case the Salt Lake ~Council granted a fran--
chise permitting the Rio Grande Western to build a spur 
from its main line track across the ·city street and sidewalk 
and on to the property of a brewing ·company which ac-
cording to plaintiff would cause vibration and in general 
make his property less valuable. 
Cereghino v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 26 Utah 467, 
7'3 P. 634. The Oregon Short Line proposed to build a spur 
across city property to serve the ~Con. Wagon & Machine 
Company. It was for purely private purposes. On page 637 
the court said : 
"* * * The public at large have an interest 
in the construction and successful operation of rail-
roads designed for the transportation of passengers 
and freight, and because of this interest the defen-
dant railroad company, in common with all others, is 
given the right to invoke the law of eminent domain, 
and subject private property to its necessary public 
uses; but it has no right, either under the law of 
eminent do?'JUL,in or a pretende'd framchise from a 
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municipality, to directly or indirectly take priva.te 
property for the purpose of building a line of rail-
way or a switch track designed and intended) to1 be 
used exclusively for the convenience and accommo-
dation of a- private business. And as stated by coun-
sel for the appellant in their brief, 'Neither can it 
subject the streets and sidewalks of a municipality, 
dedicated to public uses of the people, to additional 
servitudes or burdens in aid of private undertakings 
and enterprises.' * * *" 
The above is a good statement of the law as is shown in 18 
American Juris prudence, Section 62 of Eminent Domain, 
page 691, where the text reads : 
"* * * If a short spur is intended to increase 
the general terminal facilities of the railroad, the 
fact that it is also to be used for the benefit of a 
manufacturing establishment does not prevent its 
being for a public use. On the other hand, a spur 
track leading from the main line of the railroad to 
the establishment or place of business of an enter-
prise that is wholly private for the exclusive use of 
such enterprise is clearly not a public use, notwith-
standing the railroad company has the right to use 
the spur for general traffic but only to such extent 
as will not interfere with the business of the manu-
facturer. When, however, the branch or spur is open 
to public use in the same manner as the rest of the 
railroad, the fact that when constructed it will lead 
to the works of a single establishment and will prob-
ably be used almost wholly by that establishment is 
no bar to the acquisition of the necessary land by 
eminent domain. * * *" 
No~h v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371. 
The Supreme ·Court of Utah held that a statute giving 
a property owner the right to condemn water for the irri-
gation of a farm is constitutional because it is a public use. 
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The Court said : 
"* * * The question before us not only in-
volves the right of the farmer to invoke the law of 
eminent domain, when necessary, to enable him to 
convey water to his farm, but that of the miner, 
manufacturer, and persons engaged in other indus-
trial pursuits to build canals, flumes, and lay pipe 
lines over adjoining and intervening lands, when 
necessary for the purpose of conveying water neces-
sary for the successful prosecution of their respec-
tive enterprises. The future growth, prosperity, up-
building, and industrial expansion of the state not 
only depend upon the storing and holding back the 
high and surplus water so they can be used in times 
of scarcity, but also in a careful and judicious hus-
bandry of the supply now available; and it is entirely 
within the province of the Legislature to enact such 
laws respecting the appropriation and distribution 
thereof as will tend to prevent unnecessary loss and 
waste, so long as vested rights are upheld and main-
tained. * * * In view of the physical and cli-
matic conditions in this state, and in the light of the 
history of the arid West, which shows the marvelous 
results accomplished by irrigation, to hold that the 
use of water for irrigation is not in any sense a 
public use, and thereby place it within the power of 
a few individuals to place insurmountable barriers 
in the way of the future welfare and prosperity of 
the state would be giving to the term 'public use' alto-
gether too strict and narrow an interpretation, and 
one we do not think is contemplated by the Constitu-
tion." 
In Highland Boy Gold Mining Company v. St?·ickley, 
28 Utah 2,15, 78 P. 296, the Supreme Court of Utah held 
that a statute granting the right of eminent domain for 
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the construction of aerial tramways is not unconstitutional 
because it is a public use. On page 2H7 the court said : 
"The reason for the rule, when applied to the 
law of eminent domain, is very apparent, a.s there 
are some uses for which private property may be 
condemned, the public character of which is so plain 
that there is no room for argument; and, on the 
other hand, there are innumerable uses for which 
property may be and is used, the private character 
of which is equally clear and plain. As stated by 
counsel for respondent, in their brief: 'Between these 
two extremes, however, courts can approach a di-
viding line "\Vhich is so shadowy that it leaves room 
for argument as to whether or not a statute is con-
stitutional. A short distance on either side of the 
line the decision is plain, but on the line, and for a 
short distance on each side, it is doubtful.' And, as 
hereinbefore stated, whenever the court is· in doubt, 
it holds the statute constitutional. Therefore, unless 
it clearly appears that the use made of the right of 
way in question is private and in no sense public, 
the validity of the statute must be upheld. Some gen-
eral rules by which the question as to what consti-
tutes a public use may be determined were declared 
by this court in the case of Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 
158, 75 Pac. 3'71. In that case it was in effect held 
that when the taking is for a use that will promote 
the public interest, and which tends to develop the 
great natural resources of the state, such taking is 
for a public use." 
And on page 29-8 : 
"* * * The m1n1ng industry in this state, 
and in others similarly situated, not only produces 
a home market for the products of the farm, and 
furnishes thousands of men with steady employment 
at liberal and remunerative wages, but also produces 
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wealth which has enabled other industries to be cre-
ated and to flourish, which, without the stimulus 
thus furnished, would languish. * * *" 
For certain purposes such as mining and irrigation the 
legislature may grant the right of eminent domain without 
the public retaining any right to use the facilities to be 
built. That is on account of a high public policy to develop 
resources in the state fundamentally necessary to its wel-
fare. It does not follow at all that a railroad is given the 
right to condemn property to be used solely by the railroad 
or by certain private persons. 
Thus in Oregon an easement for a skid road to trans-
port lumber is held not a public use. 
Apex Transportation CoT~~pany v. Garrbade, 321 Ore. 582, 
52 P. 573. On page 574 the court said: 
"* * * Under these circumstances, we think 
it is manifest that the use to which the plaintiff pro ... 
poses to put the land sought to be taken is private, 
and not public; and no declaration of the objects· and 
purposes of the company in its charter or of the leg-
islature in the act under which it is proceeding, can 
give it that character, so as to entitle it to exercise 
the high prerogative of sovereignty invoked in aid of 
its enterprise. The necessity and expediency of tak-
ing private property for public use is a legislative 
question; but whether the proposed use is in fact 
public is always a judicial question, to be determined 
by the courts. * * *" 
So also in Washington a logging road \Vas held not a 
public use. 
Healy Lumber Company v. Morris, 33 Wash. 
490, 74 P. 681. 
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In both of the Oregon and Washington cases, statute·s 
expressly provided that lumbering was a public use and ex-
pressly gave the right of eminent domain to persons and 
corporations engaged in that industry. California has also 
so held in regard to public use. 
Amador Queen Mining Company v. D'ewitt, 73 
Cal. 482, 15 P. 74; 
Hercules Water Company v. Fernandez, 5 ·Cal. 
App. 726, 91 P. 401; 
Sutter v. Nicols, 93 P. 872, 15·21 Cal. 688; 
Stratford Irrigation District v. Empire Water 
Company, 111 P. (2d) 957, 44 Cal. App. 61. 
3. A RAILROAD CO·MPANY CANNOT CON-
DEMN LAND FOR USES NOT CONNE·CTED 
WITH THE CONDUCT OF' ITS BUSINESS AS 
A COMMON CARRIER. 
Elliott on Railroads, 3rd Edition, 'Sec. 1205, contains 
the following statement of the law: 
"* * * a railroad company cannot condemn 
lands for uses not connected with the conduct of its 
business as a common carrier such as the erection 
of dwellings for its employees, or the erection of a 
manufacturing establishment to supply the road with 
rolling stock and other necessary equipment * * * ." 
Cereghino v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 2;6 Utah 46·7, 
73 P. 634; 
Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484. At page 49-4, the court 
said: 
"Although railroad companies must have en-
gines and cars, iron, lumber, wood, and many other 
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things in large quantities, in order to build and OP-
erate their roads, it is supposed they can supply 
themselves as private persons do, by purchase in the 
ordinary way, and they are not created or designed 
to be independent of all other branches of industry 
and business in the country, but to be additional aids 
to their successful development. The companies must 
have shops for the repairs of cars and engines, as 
they are so often needed, and as they cannot well be 
moved for repairs, nor can facilities be found for 
repairs in the country generally, but the company 
were already supplied with all necessary accommoda-
tions for repairs. We are of opinion that an estab-
lishment for the manufacture of ·cars is not a legiti-
mate railroad necessity, so that the company could 
properly condemn land on which to erect one. 
* * * * * 
"We are of the opinion that the erection of dwell-
ing houses to rent to their employees, is not so for the 
use and accommodations of the railroad, as to au-
thorize the seizure of land upon which to erect them, 
under any circumstances." 
Rensselaer wnd Saratoga R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137. 
On page 146, the court said: 
"The construction of dwellings for employees or 
officers, and the construction of slips for the accom-
modation of vessels bringing freight to, or taking it 
from the railroad company, are not, we think, upon 
the proofs before us, necessary corporate purposes 
within the statute. 
* * * * * 
"It is difficult, as a matter of law, to define by 
general statement what purposes are corporate pur-
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poses, or what are the necessary purposes for which 
lands may, under this act, be taken; and: probably 
the subject is incapable of exact limitation. 
"It may however be safely ass·erted that the 
acquisition of lands for the purpose of speculation 
or sale, or to prevent interference by competing lines, 
or methods of transportation, or in aid of collateral 
enterprises remotely connected with the running or 
operating of the road, although they may increase 
its revenue and business, are not such purposes as 
authorize the condemnation of private property." 
Great Falls Po~ver Co. v. G. F. & 0. D. R. Co., 
104 Va. 416, 52 S. E. 172. 
The court refused eminent domain of property for a 
park at a terminal. On page 173 the court said: 
"It clearly appears that this land is sought by 
appellee as a terminal point on account of the rare 
scenic features it affords, and because of the attrac-
tions it would hold out to pleasure seekers from the 
city of Washington. In other respects the location 
possesses none of the advantages ordinarily accruing 
to a railroad, and but for the beauty of the scene 
would most likely have been avoided as. offering no 
inducements to such an enterprise. It is further clear 
from the record that the quantity of land sought to 
be condemned is far beyond any necessity for mere 
terminal purposes of an electric railway extending 
a distance of 14 miles from the city of Washington. 
It is manifest from the evidence that the location 
was selected vvith no reference to the public use of 
the road in the matter of freight or the _accommoda-
tion of the traveling public along the route, but that 
the real purpose of the condemnation is to establish 
a park overlooking the Great F·ans of the Potomac, 
for the comfort and pleasure of sight-seers and cur-
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iosity seekers, and to thereby add to the revenues of 
appellee by making the point an attractive place of 
resort." 
In re Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108 
N.Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN ~COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
